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By PATRICK M. MALONE* AND EILEEN M. MALONE**
INTRODUCTION
As of January 1, 1980, the Kentucky Penal Code had
been in effect for five years,' during which time it was ex-
amined in a moderate number of cases and suffered a modest
number of legislative changes. Although this article empha-
sizes those changes made during the 1979-80 period, the re-
cent revisions are examined against the background of all
post-enactment legislative modifications.
If one of the major purposes of the code's enactment was
to eliminate the plethora of specific statutes that had come to
dominate Kentucky law,2 the code has been only a partial suc-
cess because it has been subjected to "hit and miss" amend-
ing.3 Various chapters have undergone revision,4 with signifi-
cant legislative changes occurring in the burglary chapter 5
during its two journeys through the amendment process.6 This
Survey will discuss these amendments to the burglary chapter
and will analyze cases that have construed the statutes
* Assistant Commonwealth Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit, Lexington, Ken-
tucky. B.A. 1975, University of Kentucky;, J.D. 1978, University of Kentucky.
** J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
I Enacted during the 1974 legislative session, the Kentucky Penal Code became
effective January 1, 1975.
OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF
LAW, REPORT OF SEMINAR ON KENTUCKY PENAL CODE 215 (1974).
The possibility that potential "defects" in the code would surface and necessi-
tate remedial legislative action was recognized prior to the effective date of the legis-
lation. Id. at 3.
4 Important legislative changes have occurred in the persistent felony offender
statute, Ky. REV. STAT. chapter 532 [hereinafter cited as KRS], which was first
amended in 1978 (1978 Ky. Acts ch. 78, § 6) and again in 1980 (1980 Ky. Acts ch. 309,
§ 5).
Additionally, the murder statute, KRS § 532.025 (Cur. Supp. 1980), has been
amended to comply with recent constitutional decisions regarding the death penalty.
See BRICKEY, KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW § 28.04 (Supp. 1978) for a discussion of con-
stitutional requirements and limitations, and their application to KRS § 532.025 sub-
sequent to that provision's amendment.
5 KRS ch. 511 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
6 KRS ch. 511 was first amended in 1978 (1978 Ky. Acts ch. 125) and again in
1980 (1980 Ky. Acts ch. 376).
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therein.
The meaning of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chap-
ter 514 (Theft and Related Offenses) has been considered re-
peatedly by the appellate courts during this Survey year. This
need for construction is due to the difficulty involved in rec-
onciling the penal code theft provisions with pre-1975 tradi-
tional larceny concepts.' With the exception of the addition of
welfare fraud legislation supplanting prosecution of welfare
fraud under theft by deception,8 the chapter, however, has
avoided alteration since enactment, despite suggestions that
changes are in order." The cases construing the theft chapter
will be analyzed in this article. Finally, this Survey will dis-
cuss the constitutionality of Kentucky's harassment and
harassing communications statutes.
I. BURGLARY
Prior to enactment of the penal code in 1975, the statu-
tory definition contained in the governing burglary provision"0
was so narrowly construed by the courts" that the legislature
found it necessary to promulgate many "gap filling" statutes 2
in order to address conduct outside the scope of the burglary
provision. The penal code consolidated these diverse statutes
7 For a discussion of pre-code treatment of larceny and the proposed consolida-
tion of the numerous provisions by current KRS ch. 514, see OFFICE OF CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW, REPORT OF SEMINAR ON
KENTUCKY PENAL CODE, 215-22 (1974).
8 See text accompanying notes 76-77 infra for a detailed discussion of this
legislation.
9 See Brickey, An Introduction to the Kentucky Penal Code: A Critique of Pure
Reason? 61 Ky. L.J. 624, 634-35 (1972-73).
:0 KRS § 433.120 (1948) (amended 1975).
1 "The basic offense is common law burglary which has a statutory penalty pro-
vision (KRS § 433.120) but is defined by case law." Ky. PENAL CODE §§ 1200-07,
Comment (Final Draft, 1971). It should be noted that the commentary to the 1971
Final Draft is the official "commentary accompanying the Code" for purposes of stat-
utory construction. Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Ky. 1976).
12 Examples include burglary of a bank (KRS § 433.130 (repealed 1975)); armed
burglary (KRS § 433.140 (repealed 1975)); housebreaking (KRS § 433.180 (repealed
1975)); storehousebreaking (KRS § 433.190 (repealed 1975)); railroad station breaking




into KRS Chapter 511,1' which set forth three basic classes of
burglary: first, second and third degree. Burglary third de-
gree1 encompassed any unauthorized entry into any building
with intent to commit a crime and carried a penalty of one to
five years.15 Burglary second degree' was defined as any un-
authorized entry, with aggravating factors,'7 into a non-dwell-
ing building and carried a penalty of five to ten years.18 Bur-
glary first degree required entry into a dwelling, concurrent
with the presence of certain aggravating factors, such as
armed entry, causing injury, or entering at night.' 9 Burglary
first degree carried a penalty range of from ten to twenty
years.2"
Although these three statutes comprehensively replaced
the common law scheme, the 1978 term of the General Assem-
bly altered the laws to provide enhanced penalties for certain
kinds of burglary.21 Unauthorized entry into any dwelling at
any time, even absent aggravating factors, became burglary
first degree.22 The amendment was evidently an attempt to
deter residential burglaries but ironically may have failed to
achieve this purpose by creating a penalty that, in the au-
thors' opinions, was often too severe for juries to impose for
simple, non-aggravated residential burglary.
In conjunction with the modification of the burglary first
degree provision, burglary second degree was redefined: "A
person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with
,3 KRS ch. 511 is entitled "Burglary and Related Offenses" and includes within
the scope of its provisions the crimes of criminal trespass (KRS §§ 511.060-.080) and
possession of burglar's tools (KRS § 511.050). KRS ch. 511 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
" KRS § 511.040 (1975) (amended 1978).
15 KRS § 511.040(2) (1975) (amended 1978); KRS § 532.060(2)(d) (1975)
(amended 1978).
Is KRS § 511.030 (1975) (amended 1978).
17 Aggravating factors cited in the statute were (1) possession of weapons by bur-
glar, (2) causing physical injury to any person not a participant, and (3) using or
threatening to use a dangerous instrument against any person not a participant. Id.
Is KRS § 511.030(2) (1975) (amended 1978); KRS § 532.060(2)(c) (1975)
(amended 1978).
19 KRS § 511.020 (1975) (amended 1978).
20 KRS § 511.020(2)(b) (1975) (amended 1978).
21 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 125. See also J. PALMORE, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JU-
RIES § 3.01 (Supp. 1979).
22 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 125.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the intent to commit a crime, he kno'wingly enters or remains
unlawfully in an inhabited building. 2 3 This provision seems
simply to increase the penalty in circumstances where another
person is present in the building, for what would otherwise be
burglary third degree. Nevertheless, "inhabited" suggested to
some that it might also include dwellings that were unoccu-
pied.24 The question was resolved in Litton v. Common-
wealth,25 wherein the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
term "inhabited building" encompasses only those buildings
in which someone other than the burglar is present.26
In response to problems encountered in the application of
the 1978 changes, the 1980 session of the General Assembly
enacted new burglary provisions. Burglary first degree is now
burglary of a building 1) when armed, 2) when use of a dan-
gerous instrument is threatened, or 3) when a non-participant
sustains injury.28 Burglary second degree now covers all non-
aggravated residential burglaries, 2 and burglary third degree
remains unchanged.
It is significant that the changes in KRS Chapter 511
have occurred principally in the penalties for various kinds of
burglary. The 1978 amendments had resulted in a disruption
of the penal code's comprehensive scheme of equity in punish-
ment.30 For example, under these initial changes, a daytime
burglary of an unoccupied residence carried the same penalty
as assault first degree31 or robbery first degree. 2 The response
23 KRS § 511.030 (1978) (amended 1980).
24 J. PALMORE, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 3.02 (Supp. 1979).
21 597 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1980).
2' The Court explained:
In order to give effect to this statutory scheme, we conclude that the
drafters of the 1978 amendment meant to base the second degree/third de-
gree distinction on the presence or absence of persons in the building at the
time of the burglary, because the potential for physical injury is made
greater by the presence of other persons who may be encountered in the
process of the burglary.
Id. at 618.
27 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 376.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See Brickey, supra note 9, at 631.
21 KRS § 508.010 (1978).
32 KRS § 515.020 (1978).
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to criticisms of such alterations33 embodied in the 1980
amendments indicates legislative recognition of the need for
an internally consistent penalty scheme.
In addition to legislative consideration of the burglary
statutes, the Kentucky Supreme Court's attention was drawn
to those laws during the Survey year. In recent cases, the
Court construed the term "dwelling," which appears in the
second degree burglary statute,3 to include the home of a re-
cently deceased person 5 and the home of a family in the pro-
cess of moving, where the family was sleeping in the new
home at the time the previous home was burglarized.3 6 These
decisions indicate that the Court will broadly construe "dwell-
ing" to uphold convictions for burglary even when the build-
ing is unoccupied and when the inherent dangers traditionally
considered to justify the severity of the penalty are not
present.
37
In Stamps v. Commonwealth,5 the Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that entry into the air
pockets of concrete blocks comprising the wall of a building is
insufficient to constitute burglary and instead should be clas-
sified as attempted burglary.3 9 Therefore, the question in de-
termining whether entry was accomplished within the mean-
ing of the burglary chapter is not whether the intruder's entry
went beyond the "outer skin" of the building but is whether
the entry penetrated the "inner skin."
II. THEFT
The appellate courts rendered several significant deci-
33 This kind of alteration was explicitly cautioned against prior to the code's en-
actment. See Brickey, supra note 9, at 631.
11 KRS § 511.030(1) states, "A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree
when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully
in a dwelling." Id. KRS § 511.010(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980) defines "dwelling" as "a
building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein." Id.
Simpson v. Commonwealth, 592 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1980) (per curiam).
38 Starnes v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1980).
'7 "[B]urglary is designed to encompass all unlawful intrusions which are accom-
panied by alarm and danger to occupants." Ky. PENAL CODE § 1207, Comment (Final
Draft, 1971).




sions interpreting the theft statutes during 1979-80. The theft
chapter,4 ° which purports to be a comprehensive treatment of
theft,41 is frequently obscure when an attempt is made to de-
termine the statutory provision applicable to a particular
crime. For example, it is questionable whether rental of a mo-
tor vehicle through deception is a theft of services 42 or is in-
stead a theft by deception4 3 The KRS definition of services
specifically includes the use of vehicles;44 the commentary to
the theft by deception statute,45 however, states that theft by
deception encompasses fraudulent renting of motor vehicles.
46
Adding to this confusion is the "theft by failure to make re-
quired disposition" provision,4 which apparently attempts to
regulate a broad spectrum of conduct.
A. Commonwealth v. Day
In Commonwealth v. Day,48 the defendant was found in
possession of a stolen vehicle, but there was no proof that he
had stolen the property in question. The Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for theft by unlaw-
ful taking. That theft statute provides: "(1) A person is guilty
of theft by unlawful taking or disposition when he unlawfully:
(a) Takes or exercises control over movable property of an-
other with intent to deprive him thereof.
'49
Day was convicted under jury instructions that dealt only
with the "exercises control" language of the statute. The court
o KRS ch. 514 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
41 Ky. PENAL CODE § 1500, Introduction (Final Draft, 1971). See also Common-
wealth v. Day, 599 S.W.2d 166, 167 n.2 (Ky. 1980).
42 KRS § 514.060 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
13 KRS § 514.040 (Cur. Supp. 1980).
44 KRS § 514.010(8) (Cum. Supp. 1980) states: "'Services' includes labor, profes-
sional service, transportation, telephone, electricity, gas, water or other public service,
accommodation in hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, admission to exhibitions, use of
vehicles or other movable property" (emphasis added).
"' KRS § 514.040 (Cu. Supp. 1980).
46 Ky. PENAL CODE § 1515, Comment (Final Draft, 1971).
4" KRS § 514.070 (Cu. Supp. 1980). This statute covers situations in which the
defendant fails to make a required payment or disposition of property arising out of
an agreement or legal obligation.
48 599 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1980).
4' KRS § 514.030 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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of appeals reversed, finding "that the 'exercises control' lan-
guage was intended to be no more than the statutory
equivalent of embezzlement." 50 The court concluded that "ex-
ercises control" was the equivalent of a "taking" in the em-
bezzlement sense, i.e., the term would not apply where the
property was physically taken without permission of the own-
er but rather would apply where one lawfully came into pos-
session of another's property and subsequently misappropri-
ated it. Thus the court reasoned that the jury instructions
were "erroneous because there was no evidence of lawful pos-
session by Day at the outset."51 The Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals decision, stating that the offense of theft
by unlawful taking encompasses either taking or exercising
control, as long as the act is accompanied by the requisite in-
tent to deprive another of property.
5 2
The Day opinion illustrates one difference between the
Kentucky Penal Code and the Model Penal Code, in that the
Kentucky code has eliminated the distinction between larceny
and embezzlement53 found in the Model Code.5 4 The Supreme
Court, therefore, held that "exercises control" is not to be lim-
ited to an embezzlement situation but is to be given its ordi-
narily-understood meaning.5 5 Under this interpretation, Day
was within the scope of the theft by unlawful taking statute if
he exercised control over the vehicle on the date he was ap-
prehended and had the requisite intent, regardless of whether
he was the individual who initially stole the vehicle.
Because the court of appeals position is the more conven-
"o 599 S.W.2d at 167.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 168.
53 "Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single offense em-
bracing the separate offenses presently known as larceny, embezzlement, false pre-
tenses, extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen property, uttering
worthless checks, operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent and the
like." Ky. PENAL CODE § 1500, Introduction (Final Draft, 1971) (emphasis added).
5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Model Penal
Code's commentary distinguishes between "takes lawful control" and "exercises un-
lawful control," saying the former refers to larceny-related offenses while the latter
applies to embezzlement-related crimes.
55 599 S.W.2d at 168.
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tional one,56 the Supreme Court's decision in Day is a signifi-
cant interpretation of Kentucky's theft by unlawful taking
statute. This decision may resolve the prosecutor's dilemma
over whether to indict an individual for theft by unlawful tak-
ing or for receiving stolen property when the evidence estab-
lishes only possession of the property. Without the Day deci-
sion, a prosecutor would have been limited (under the court of
appeals analysis) to bringing a charge of receiving stolen prop-
erty in such a case. Now he has the option of bringing either
charge, and this option may be an important one. While,
under the receiving stolen property statute, a presumption ex-
ists that an individual in possession of stolen property is
aware of the character of the property,57 that presumption is
not available under the theft by unlawful taking statute. How-
ever, under the theft by unlawful taking statute the prosecu-
tion's burden of establishing intent-to-deprive is lessened by
the fact that intent may be inferred from the circumstances of
possession."
B. Commonwealth v. Jeter
Commonwealth v. Jeter e reached the court of appeals on
certification by the Commonwealth following the trial court's
dismissal of a multi-count indictment for theft by failure to
make required disposition of property. KRS section 514.070
provides that: "(1) A person is guilty of theft by failure to
88 Id.
KRS § 514.110(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
88 "The Court based its conclusion on the permissible inference that in the ab-
sence of a satisfactory explanation of possession, the possessor of recently stolen
property is guilty of the theft." Commonwealth v. Day, 599 S.W.2d at 169 (citing
Howe v. Commonwealth, 462 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1971)).
The Kentucky Supreme Court's construction of KRS § 514.030 is strikingly simi-
lar to the "recent and exclusive possession principle" existing under the New York
theft scheme. In New York, if a defendant is found in recent and exclusive possession
of stolen property, a rebuttable presumption exists that the possession is criminal,
i.e., that the defendant committed the theft. Obviously, absence of an explanation or
a false explanation would be inadequate to rebut this presumption, and the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof would be satisfied. People v. Giesa, 337 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y.
1972); People v. Adams, 310 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. 1970); People v. Foley, 121 N.E.2d 516
(N.Y. 1954).
59 590 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
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make required disposition of property received when: (a) He
obtains property on agreement or subject to a known legal ob-
ligation to make specified payment ...."
Phillip Ray Jeter operated a used furniture store in Lex-
ington, Kentucky and, on the four occasions charged in the
indictment, received money for appliances under an agree-
ment for subsequent delivery. In one instance there was a
complete failure to deliver; in another, the item was received
in unsatisfactory condition. The Commonwealth sought an in-
dictment under section 514.070 on the theory that Jeter re-
ceived money subject to an obligation to deliver property and
that his conduct amounted to a failure to fulfill that
obligation.
In substance, the number of charges was sufficient to in-
dicate that the failure to deliver involved more than mere neg-
ligent non-performance. The trial court, in granting a motion
to dismiss the indictment, focused on the commentary to KRS
section 514.070, that states in part:
It is not the purpose of Section 1530 to impose a criminal
obligation or sanction to the relationship of debtor and cred-
itor. To constitute an offense there must be a breach of
trust, growing out of a contract or confidential relation.60
On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that a fiduciary re-
lationship existed between the parties on the basis of the
agreement to deliver.61 Refusing to address the question in
this manner, the appellate court held that this situation was
not one in which KRS section 514.070 applied but rather was
a case where theft by deception62 was the more appropriate
charge.63
The opinion imposes an important limitation on the
scope of KRS section 514.070. Absent strict construction, the
statute is potentially subject to abuse in that, on its face, it
purports to govern such a wide variety of circumstances.6 The
60 Ky. PENAL CODE § 1530, Comment (Final Draft, 1971).
61 590 S.W.2d at 347.
62 KRS § 514.040 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
63 590 S.W.2d at 347.
64 For example, the statute presumably could cover situations where a leased ve-
hicle is retained after expiration of the lease.
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Jeter decision, in finding the conduct within the purview of
the theft by deception statute, indicates that a defendant sim-
ilarly situated is guilty of a theft offense only if he intended
not to fulfill the promise to make delivery at the time the
money was obtained. As long as this intent did not exist con-
current with receipt of payment, the purchaser is in effect a
creditor of the defendant, and KRS section 514.070 is not ap-
plicable despite the subsequent intentional non-performance.
The decision, however, does not resolve the question of
the quantity of proof that will be required under a prosecu-
tion for theft by deception in these circumstances. Because a
conviction for theft by deception cannot be sustained solely
on the basis of non-performance, 5 the question presented is
whether the pattern of non-performance is egregious enough
to establish the element of deception.
In contrast to Jeter, Blanton v. Commonwealth66 pro-
vides an excellent example of conduct falling squarely within
the proscription of KRS section 514.070. In Blanton, the court
of appeals held a contractor who had received payments from
the owner of a building and who failed to apply an appropri-
ate portion of the funds to satisfy subcontractor claimse 7
guilty of theft by failure to make required disposition.68
It is interesting to note that the Kentucky appellate
courts have thus far failed to address authoritatively the most
confusing element of KRS section 514.070: the definition of
"obtain." KRS section 514.070 requires that a defendant "ob-
tain" the property subject to a known obligation. "Obtain" is
defined in KRS as: "(a) In relation to property, to bring about
a transfer or purported transfer from another person of a legal
interest in the property, whether to the obtainer or another;
or (b) In relation to labor or services, to secure performance
thereof."69 Therefore, the keynote is that quality of title suffi-
cient to constitute "obtaining."
Consider a situation in which A informally allows B to
65 590 S.W.2d at 347.
60 562 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
"That obligation arises under KRS § 376.070 (1972).
68 562 S.W.2d at 92.
69 KRS § 514.010(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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borrow A's car to travel across town and back. B then decides
to abscond with the vehicle and proceeds to drive to Florida.
Did B acquire sufficient title from A to be guilty of theft by
failure to make required disposition, as opposed to guilt for
theft by unlawful taking? Is the answer different if the vehicle
was rented to B, thereby giving B at least a lessee's interest in
the property? The Kentucky courts have not answered these
questions, which are further complicated by the fact that the
Kentucky Penal Code is unclear as to whether traditional
common law concepts of title are applicable to its provisions.
Until the scope of the term "obtain" is delineated, questions
will continue to arise regarding the application of KRS section
514.070 and the various other provisions within the theft
chapter.
C. Commonwealth v. McKinney
In 1979 the Kentucky Court of Appeals confronted the
question of whether welfare fraud was indictable under KRS
section 514.070 (theft by deception). In Commonwealth v. Mc-
Kinney,70 the defendants were charged under this provision
with obtaining public assistance payments in excess of $100
by means of false statements regarding eligibility. At trial, the
defendants argued that the specific provisions of KRS Chap-
ter 205 that prohibit the making of false statements to obtain
such payments and that carry a misdemeanor penalty,7 1 pre-
clude prosecution under the general theft provision. Per-
suaded by this argument, the Warren Circuit Court dismissed
the indictments.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, the court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's decision. 2 Although the appellate
court recognized that when the provisions of a specific and of
a general statute conflict, the specific statute governs,7 3 it fur-
ther found that the statutes in question were not irreconcila-
ble. The specific statute proscribed the making of false state-
70 594 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
71 KRS § 205.990 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
72 594 S.W.2d at 884.
71 Id. at 886.
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ments for the purpose of obtaining public aid irrespective of
receipt of benefits, whereas KRS section 514.070 addressed
the actual receipt of public assistance payments obtained by
false statements or misrepresentations. 4 Unlike Chapter 205,
KRS section 514.070 requires a receipt before a crime under
that section can be found. Under this construction, the rele-
vant provisions of KRS Chapter 205 do not directly conflict
with the theft statute, and thus the two can be harmonized.
Three of the appellees in McKinney argued that passage
of Senate Bill 11 by the 1979 Extraordinary Session of the
Kentucky General Assembly 5 clearly indicated that the legis-
lature had intended KRS Chapter 205 to be the exclusive
statutory provision governing welfare fraud prosecutions.
76
Senate Bill 11 amended KRS Chapter 205 to provide felony
status in cases where false statements are made to obtain wel-
fare benefits in excess of $100, and in cases where the welfare
fraud is commercial in nature. The court dismissed the appel-
lees' contention, finding no evidence of such legislative intent
and noting that the recent legislation was simply part and
parcel of the extensive welfare reform. 7
Senate Bill 11, beyond providing much needed clarity,
eliminates the cumbersome process of indictment that existed
under KRS section 514.070. In an indictment for theft by de-
ception, each welfare payment constituted a separate count,
resulting in lengthy multi-count indictments. While Senate
Bill 11 is, in essence, supplemental theft legislation outside
the penal code, it provides a more practical mode of welfare
fraud prosecution by permitting the aggregate amount of pay-
ments received to result in a single felony charge.7 8
III. HARASSING COMMUNICATIONS AND HARASSMENT
A. Harassing Communications
In January, 1979 Stanley Green was convicted in the Fay-
74 Id. at 887.
75 1979 Ky. Acts Extra. Session ch. 2.
76 594 S.W.2d at 888.
77 Id.
78 1979 Ky. Acts Extra. Session ch. 2.
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ette District Court on a charge of harassing communications.
The proscribed conduct consisted of a series of unwarranted
and annoying telephone calls to the complainant, a former
girlfriend, and the writing of the word "BEWARE" in the
snow on her automobile.7 9 KRS section 525.080 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of harassing communications when
with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person he:
(a) Communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise,
by telephone, telegraph, mail or any other form of written
communication in a manner which causes annoyance or
alarm and serves no purpose of legitimate communication;
or (b) Makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation
ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication.
(2) Harassing communications is a Class B Misdemeanor.8 0
The constitutionality of this statute was successfully chal-
lenged in the Fayette Circuit Court, in Green v. Common-
wealth,81 with the court stating: "KRS 525.080 is clearly over-
broad and unconstitutional since it includes within its
proscription constitutionally protected speech within the first
amendment."82
The Kentucky Court of Appeals granted a motion for dis-
cretionary review and, in an unpublished opinion, reversed
the circuit court. 3 The appellate court stated:
We find, when considering the Kentucky Harrassment [sic]
Communications statute, that there is a clear distinction be-
tween speech or messages and conduct communicated in a
public form from that type of speech and conduct which in-
volves, contrary to the clear import of the statute, intrusion
upon a justifiable privacy interest of a recipient. Where
there is involved an area where a person's interests are
predominantly private, the degree of protective rights af-
forded by the 1st Amendment is but lessened.84
The court further stated that it is not speech that the Ken-
7 Green v. Commonwealth, No. 79X002, at 1 (Fayette Cir. Ct., Aug. 6, 1979).
80 KRS § 525.080 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
No. 79X002 (Fayette Cir. Ct., Aug. 6, 1979).
82 Id. at 2.
83 Commonwealth v. Green, No. 79-CA-1405-DG (Ky. Ct. App., June 27, 1980).
8, Id. at 2 (citation deleted).
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tucky statute prohibits, but it is instead the use of private
communications as a tool for harassment that is forbidden5
Where the right of privacy is involved, the court recognized
that reasonable regulation not otherwise permitted under the
first amendment can exist to protect the privacy right. More-
over, the telephone is a particularly susceptible means for har-
assment, since individuals can be annoyed through obscene or
threatening calls. The ubiquity of the telephone renders
nearly every individual vulnerable to such abuse."' In address-
ing the argument that the broad statutory language encom-
passes protected speech, the court construed the statute to be
limited by the requirement that the actor possess specific in-
tent to annoy or alarm.8
B. Harassment
In Green, the Fayette Circuit Court cited United States
v. Sturgil,88 a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case that ex-
amined the Kentucky harassment statute" as applied to an
altercation on federal property under the Federal Assimilative
Crimes Act.90 The Sixth Circuit held the statute unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. KRS section 525.070 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of harassment when with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another person he:
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects him to physi-
cal contact or attempts or threatens to do the same; or
(b) In a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance,
gesture or display, or addresses abusive language to any per-
son present; or
(c) Follows a person in or about a public place or places; or
85 Id. at 3.
86 Id.
87 Communications, as here, must, of course, be made in a manner likely to
cause annoyance, alarm, or harass and which serve no purpose of legitimate
communication, or thusly with an intent to harass, annoy or alarm the
other person. As so construed, the statute does not suffer from a constitu-
tional infirmity since we further recognize the serious obligation to construe
the statute, if possible, to preserve its constitutionality.
Id. at 4.
88 563 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1977).
89 KRS § 525.070 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
90 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
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(d) Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits
acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and
which serve no legitimate purpose. 1
Sturgill was convicted under KRS section 525.070(1) (b)
in connection with an "altercation at the United States Naval
Ordnance Station in Louisville, Kentucky between defendant
Sturgill, a machinist at the station, and Joseph Frank Scott, a
security guard at the station.""2 The court stated that while
Sturgill's conduct was sufficiently serious to warrant prosecu-
tion, the Kentucky harassment statute was constitutionally
defective. The court said the statute could "withstand an at-
tack upon its constitutionality only if, as authoritatively con-
strued by the state courts, it is not susceptible of application
to speech protected by the First Amendment."93 In the ab-
sence of such a narrowing construction by a Kentucky state
court, the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction for
harassment.
9 4
C. The Status of the Constitutionality of the Statutes
While not binding on the Kentucky state courts,9 5 the
Sixth Circuit's decision underscores the nebulous status of
both KRS section 525.070 and KRS section 525.080. Although
neither provision has been deemed unconstitutional in a pub-
lished Kentucky appellate decision,96 the constitutionality of
both provisions is suspect. This doubt arises from the diffi-
culty involved in limiting the broad language of the provisions
so as to avoid infringement upon the first amendment right of
free speech."
The appellate court in Green presents a sound interpreta-
tion of KRS section 525.080, which unfortunately is embodied
in an unpublished opinion. The Kentucky appellate courts
91 KRS § 525.070 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
92 563 F.2d at 308.
11 Id. at 310.
9' Id. at 311.
11 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
91 Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c) states: "Opinions that are not published shall not be
cited or used as authority in any other case in any court of this state."
97 BucKEY, supra note 4, § 23.07 at 264-65, § 23.08 at 268.
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have to date taken no further action to construe either the
harassment or the harassing communications provisions. The
unpalatable result is evidenced by the decision in Sturgill, i.e.,
the harassment conviction would have withstood a constitu-
tional challenge had there existed a sufficiently restrictive
construction of the statute by the Kentucky courts. 8
Whether the appellate courts will resolve the constitu-
tional questions posed by these statutes in a final and authori-
tative decision remains to be seen. The resolution is rendered
more uncertain in that appeals from the state district courts
are rarely pursued further than to the circuit court, particu-
larly where, as with the harassment charge, the maximum
penalty is a fine of $250."9
98 563 F.2d at 310.
99 KRS § 525.070(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
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